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Non-discriminatory Data Dissemination in 
Practice 
Frans von der Dunk
International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden University, The Netherlands 
Abstract 
A key element of the UN Principles on Remote Sensing is the concept of “non-discrimi-
natory access.” This chapter examines this concept in detail, through a general discussion 
and through illustrative examples where it is directly related to data policy issues, includ-
ing ESA, EUMETSAT, and CEOS. 
1  Introduction 
One of the major issues in the UN Principles discussed in Chapter 4 concerns the exact 
and authoritative interpretation and implementation of the central concept of Principle 
XII of the UN Resolution, namely the “access to [remote sensing data] on a non-discrimi-
natory basis.” As noted in Chapter 4, “discrimination” essentially entails making distinc-
tions between equal cases, that is cases which are not different from each other on those 
points that matter. This, however, still begs the question, or rather several questions. What 
is “equal”? What are points that matter, and points that do not? Who decides on such is-
sues in particular cases? Is Principle XII taken into account at all? And most importantly 
perhaps, is there a uniform answer to these questions or does everyone have their own in-
terpretation and implement the Resolution accordingly? 
The UN Resolution purports to provide generally and globally relevant principles in 
the field of satellite remote sensing. For data policy issues any international legal rules 
on access to remote sensing data are obviously crucial. Hence, on this particular point it 
would be of obvious importance if such questions could be answered. The present chap-
ter presents an effort in that direction by firstly having another look at Principle XII of 
Resolution 41/65 in its specific context. 
Then, by way of case studies, some documents collected in the framework of EOPOLE 
will be analyzed . These documents drafted by various relevant bodies involved in re-
mote sensing data dissemination (try to) provide for data policies of those respective bod-
ies. They will be scrutinized as to whether and how they have explicitly or implicitly im-
plemented the principle of “non-discriminatory access” to satellite remote sensing data in 
their particular field of activity. 
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2  A Second Look at Principle XII of the UN Resolution 
As soon as the primary data and the processed data concerning the territory under its jurisdic-
tion are produced, the sensed State shall have access to them on a non-discriminatory basis and 
on reasonable cost terms. The sensed State shall also have access to the available analyzed  in-
formation concerning the territory under its jurisdiction in the possession of any State partici-
pating in remote sensing activities on the same basis and terms, particular regard being given 
to the needs and interests of the developing countries. 
Further to what has been discussed elsewhere the first thing to be noted here is the word 
“basis,” which denotes that the “non-discrimination” principle is not an absolute prin-
ciple. Whatever “non-discrimination” would turn out to mean anyway, it should form 
the point of departure from which deviations are in principle allowed. Also, the addi-
tion “and on reasonable cost terms” is noteworthy. Apparently, considerations of cost in-
volved in collecting, processing and analyzing data could already serve as such a justifi-
cation for what otherwise might have constituted discrimination. 
Secondly, the focus of the principle on “the sensed State” is important. It has already 
been noted that this is a consequence of the free remote sensing – versus permanent sov-
ereignty dichotomy. Proponents of the latter position claimed preferential or exclusive 
rights to the data concerning their own territory, or even the right to prohibit the collec-
tion of data altogether, against the purported freedom of data collection by remote sens-
ing satellites. 
This evaluation is further confirmed by looking at a few other Principles provided by 
Resolution 41/65 (see Appendix C). Thus, Principle II holds that “Remote sensing activi-
ties shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of 
their degree of economic, social or scientific and technological development, and taking 
into particular consideration the needs of the developing countries.” Largely, the perma-
nent sovereignty position was that of the developing countries, for the time being unable 
in technical and financial terms to undertake their own remote sensing activities and thus 
both without direct interests in freedom of remote sensing, and without the principled 
possibility to reciprocate undesired satellite remote sensing activities. Positive discrimi-
nation of the sensed state by means of preferential access, exclusive access or a veto right, 
was seen as one way to protect their interests. 
In a similar vein. Principle XIII asks for “international cooperation, especially with re-
gard to the needs of developing countries” by means of “consultations with a State whose 
territory is sensed in order to make available opportunities for participation and enhance 
the mutual benefits to be derived therefrom,” “upon request” by the sensed state. The 
major function of this Principle seems to lie in placating sensed states that have not been 
granted any right to “positive discrimination” by the other Principles. It would certainly 
be difficult to deduce any obligation to achieve a certain result — e.g. access on a prefer-
ential basis — from this rather general and non-committing clause. 
Principle III provides that “Remote sensing activities shall be conducted in accordance 
with international law,” making specific reference to the United Nations Charter and the 
treaties underpinning the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). “Non- discrimi-
nation” is one of the more fundamental principles in international law at large, as well as 
within the Charter and ITU-regulation, and has an important component of not discrim-
inating between developed and developing countries de facto. Since “the facts” (of life) 
within the international community clearly reflect a very uneven and unequal position 
for various states, this probably should read as “positively discriminating” the develop-
ing countries de jure. 
Likewise, Principle IV makes reference to “the principles contained in article I” of the 
Outer Space Treaty, as ruling the conduct of remote sensing activities. This Article “in 
particular provides that the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the 
benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or sci-
entific development.” The Principle itself makes further reference to “respect for the prin-
ciple of full and permanent sovereignty of all States and peoples over their own wealth 
and natural resources” and “the legitimate rights and interests of the sensed State.” 
In short: the principle of non-discrimination, put forward as the basis for any data dis-
semination policy, as far as provided by Resolution 41/65 seems very much focused on 
not discriminating between sensed states and third states interested in a particular set of 
data. In addition, in view of the fact that developing countries would be most likely to 
find themselves only in the role of “sensed state,” “positive discrimination” of developing 
states is recommended. 
However, it remains to be seen whether the various organizations having drafted data 
policies to interpret and respectively implement this principle did so in the same limited 
fashion, or whether they hold different views, and if so what juridical consequences this 
would have. In the last resort, independently from any particular manifestation of the 
principle in UN Resolution 41/65, the “non-discrimination” principle in a more general 
sense forms one of the pillars of international law, not to be easily negated or discarded in 
any particular field of international activities. 
3  The European Space Agency: ERS And Envisat 
The European Space Agency (ESA) so far has undertaken two comprehensive satellite re-
mote programs, inclusive of satellite operations, data handling, and data distribution. The 
first concerned the two European Remote Sensing Satellites ERS-1 and ERS-2, a program 
that started in the early 1980s. The data policy for both ERS missions was based on one 
hand on “free access to the data on an open and non-discriminatory basis,” reflective of 
the “spirit” of UN Resolution 41/65. On the other hand, ownership and full title to the re-
sulting data was proclaimed as a potentially restrictive tool for implementing data pol-
icy wherever and whenever “free access” was not deemed to be reasonable and desirable: 
“free access” apparently was not considered to be an absolute principle. 
Upon closer inspection it appears that ESA considered the core element of “non-dis-
crimination” to lie in freedom of access to ERS data for everyone in a principled way 
through a non-exclusive licensing system. As long as “nobody in the world can obtain 
ERS data alone whilst restricting its use to anyone else,” the relevant condition provided 
by Resolution 41/65 is considered fulfilled. Thus, the extensive licensing scheme either 
through so-called Principal Investigators or directly to users, was used as an extension of 
the ownership and full title to the data for the purpose of providing “public availability 
[…] through recognized channels and licenses.” It is clear, finally, that fees formed an im-
portant aspect of the licensing system. 
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The second program concerns the more recent Envisat. ESA’s Earth Observation Pro-
gram Board approved the Envisat Data Policy on 19 February 1998, after the third revi-
sion. The document “defines an overall set of policies and rules for access to all Envisat 
data and the associated products and services.” Registration of Envisat with the United 
Nations Secretary-General in conformity with the Registration Convention confirms 
ESA’s unequivocal ownership and title to use intellectual property rights mechanisms as 
the major data policy tool. 
Envisat data are to be “available in an open and non-discriminatory way,” in explicit 
conformity with Resolution 41/65, and with the addition that “Envisat distributing enti-
ties shall provide services to users in a fair and non-discriminatory way.” The relativity 
of the “non-discrimination” principle immediately becomes clear when further details are 
provided on the system of distributing Envisat data. “Nationally registered […] entities 
from Participating States shall have a higher priority than those from non-Participating 
States in the selection process for distributing entities, in absence of other elements of discrim-
ination” (emphasis added). Thus, it is both recognized that some sort of discrimination is 
already involved in selecting national distributing entities for the purpose of Envisat data 
dissemination, and that other forms of “discrimination” might also be allowed in spite of 
— read: whilst still considered to be in conformity with — UN Resolution 41/65. 
If one looks at further details of the Envisat data distribution scheme two such forms 
of “discrimination” come to the fore quite prominently. They relate to the two fundamen-
tal forms of data dissemination arising in cases of remote sensing satellites being run by 
operational entities themselves also controlling dissemination. The first concerns distribu-
tion “on Earth,” that is after they have been received, and where appropriate, processed; 
the second distribution “from space,” in other words direct reception by other entities au-
thorized by the relevant operational entity. 
For the first category, the distinction is made between “Category 1 use,” that is use for 
research and applications development support, and “Category 2 use,” that is all other uses 
including specifically operational and commercial use (see also Chapter 2). The distinction 
is mainly given expression through the pricing structure. In respect of category 1 use, us-
ers will only have to pay a price “at or near the cost of reproduction of the data,” and such 
a fee will be waived moreover in case of projects either approved in the framework of the 
Envisat program or by the Earth Observation Program Board as such. In respect of cate-
gory 2 use, ESA will fix the price of data at which these will be sold to distributing entities 
who are then allowed to set their own (higher) prices in order to make a profit. 
The extent to which such distributing entities will, in law or in fact, be forced to imple-
ment themselves any “non-discrimination” principle, is difficult to distill from the texts. 
Distributing entities are explicitly allowed to define their own pricing policies in this re-
gard, but any (further) distribution will have to take place in accordance with the Envi-
sat data policy — that is including the prominent reference to the “non-discrimination” 
principle. ESA maintains some sort of control through its right to fix a ceiling level for the 
market price; but this rather rough tool is the only means to force distributing entities to 
adhere to the principle in terms of pricing. Again, the major justification for this seems to 
be the non-exclusive character of any license as was the case with the ERS data, and in ad-
dition the limited time-span for any license. 
The second form of “discrimination” arises where the possibility for ground stations 
to receive data directly from the Envisat satellite is concerned. The national ground re-
ceiving stations of the states participating in the Envisat program have the right to re-
ceive Envisat data without having to pay a fee, but in turn these states have an obligation 
to implement the Envisat data policy in their respective territories in good faith. Foreign 
stations — that is stations in states not participating in the Envisat program — will be 
charged an access fee. 
ESA, in short, does adhere in name to the “non-discrimination” principle as pro-
claimed by Principle XII of Resolution 41/65, and can justify any differentiation in its data 
access policy by pointing at the fundamentally different cases underlying such different 
treatments. While, furthermore, no reference has been made to the special interests of ei-
ther “sensed states” or developing states, the possibility even remains in fact to respect 
in any particular case the special rights and interests of such states. Taken from the other 
end, however, neither can any principled adherence to such rights and interests be dis-
tilled or presumed. 
4  EUMETSAT: Data Policy Developments 
The 15th EUMETSAT Council agreed to a first fundamental and comprehensive EUMET-
SAT Data Policy on 4 and 5 June 1991. The desire to draft such a document was the re-
sult of developments, including the increasing commercialization of the meteorological 
remote sensing sector, which challenged the traditional principle of “free and open ex-
change of data” and called for certain important restrictions to that principle, while con-
tinuing to adhere to the principle of free exchange of certain data amongst the members 
of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). 
In 1998, a new Resolution on EUMETSAT Principles on Data Policy was adopted at the 
38th meeting of the EUMETSAT Council on 1-3 July, which developed EUMETSAT’s data 
policy. Since 1991, perhaps the most important quasi-legislative event at the global level rel-
evant for the issue of data policy in terms of meteorological satellite remote sensing con-
cerned the promulgation of WMO Resolution 40 (see Appendix B). The dichotomy between 
scientific data of public value and commercial use of satellite data had increased in impor-
tance. WMO Resolution 40 in dealing with this issue consequently had the effect of strength-
ening EUMETSAT in its resolve to continue to apply a data distribution system reflecting 
this dichotomy. Thus, the “need to preserve the benefits of EUMETSAT membership” was 
now explicitly mentioned in the preamble paragraphs to the EUMETSAT Data Policy. 
The national meteorological services of the member states now receive all EUMETSAT 
data for free, but only as far as “for their Official Duty Use” (emphasis added). Principle I 
further defines “official duty” as encompassing all “internal” activities of the organization 
as well as those “external activities […] resulting from legal, governmental or intergov-
ernmental requirements relating to defense, civil aviation, and the safety of life and prop-
erty.” In other words all commercial activities of a national meteorological service may 
no longer avail themselves of EUMETSAT data for free. Principle III indeed provides that 
for such commercial activities the national meteorological services are to be treated “in an 
equivalent way” to other commercially operating entities. 
Principles IV through VII of the EUMETSAT Data Policy provide that certain sets of 
data are to be provided for free, namely to all WMO members as following from Resolu-
tion 40, to national meteorological services of non-EUMETSAT member states for official 
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duty, for research and educational projects per se, and to the ECMWF for its own use. All 
other users qualify for reception of data, products and services “under conditions defined 
by the Council.” This obviously involves the levying of fees, although the Council may 
waive such payment. 
Most interesting from the perspective of Resolution 41/65 and its emphasis on the 
needs and interests of developing countries in the framework of data distribution on 
a “non-discriminatory” basis is Annex III of the EUMETSAT Data Policy, dealing with 
the various fees wherever applicable. A threefold structure is applied to national mete-
orological services of non-EUMETSAT member states. For those states with a per-cap-
ita GNP below or equal to US$ 2,000, data for “official duty” usage are provided to the 
national meteorological services for free. At higher per-capita GNPs, a fixed percentage 
(50% for hourly and 60% for half-hourly data) of an equivalent member state contribution 
is charged, with a certain linear gliding factor mitigating the effects of this system for the 
states whose per-capita-GNP is between US$ 2,000 and US$ 3,000. In any case, a cap is im-
posed upon fees in accordance with detailed tables. A clear picture of “positive discrim-
ination” of developing countries arises, albeit obviously as far as “official duty” usage is 
concerned. This positive discrimination, however is totally regardless of whether the ap-
plying national meteorological service is that of a “sensed state” or not. 
5  The Landsat 7 Data Policy Plan 
The United States Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 was enacted with a two-
pronged objective: to stimulate private involvement in the United States in satellite re-
mote sensing activities wherever feasible — that is most notably in the data distribution 
and marketing sector — while preserving the interests of the public at large in the conti-
nuity of the Landsat program. Section 105 of the 1992 Act in furtherance of this general 
aim called for development of a data policy for Landsat 7 data that led to the Data Policy 
Plan of 31 October 1994. 
The Data Policy Plan drafters were specifically instructed “to ensure that unenhanced 
data are available to all users at the cost of fulfilling user requests,” while ownership of 
such data would remain with the United States. On the other hand, “the provision of 
commercial value-added services based on remote sensing data [should remain] […] ex-
clusively the function of the private sector.” 
Nowhere does the Data Policy Plan itself refer explicitly to Resolution 41/65, whereas 
the underlying Act of 1992 does only refer in general terms to “international obligations” 
of the United States to which any licenses to be provided under the Act should conform. In 
view of the legal status of Resolution 41/65 it is highly doubtful whether it does provide for 
“obligations” in the legal sense of the word; therefore, the general reference in the 1992 Act 
might at best involve general and well-accepted principles contained in the Resolution. 
However, when it comes to data distribution and access issues a principle of “non-
discrimination” is invoked: Landsat 7 data “will be provided to all requesters on a non-
discriminatory basis at the ‘cost of fulfilling user requests’ (COFUR).” COFUR is defined 
by the 1992 Act as “the incremental costs associated with providing product generation, 
reproduction, and distribution of unenhanced data in response to user requests,” and 
should not include any overheads or general costs related to the satellite remote sensing 
operation. Thus, the definition of COFUR seems to come close to that of the price to be 
paid for category 1 use of ESA’s Envisat data, as being “at or near the cost of reproduction 
of the data,” albeit restricted here to unenhanced data. 
Somewhat similar also to ESA’s attitude to the “non-discrimination” principle, the 
Landsat 7 data policy document focuses on “non-exclusivity” as a fundamental concept 
capturing the perceived relevant essence of Principle XII of Resolution 41/65. The United 
States however applies this concept in a much more comprehensive fashion: contrary to 
ESA in addition to the “non-discriminatory basis” on which Landsat data will be pro-
vided. There are no comprehensive and principled restrictions whatsoever as to subse-
quent use, sale, or redistribution. 
The United States policy to draw a fundamental borderline between unenhanced data 
provided for the cost of fulfilling user requests because the basic remote sensing oper-
ations are publicly funded, and enhanced data which are to be left to the private sec-
tor both to fund and to market and sell, results in a clear and simple data distribution 
scheme. Also, this scheme seems to take any “non-discrimination” principle into account 
in a better way since complexity breeds the creation of more distinctions easily ending up 
as de facto discrimination. 
This being said, obviously the relevant licensing authorities in the United States un-
der the 1992 Act maintain a kind of subsidiary control when it comes to inter alia interna-
tional obligations of the United States and/or United States national safety, security and 
interest being at stake. The particular example of 1 meter resolution data of Israel not be-
ing allowed to be sold on the open market is an interesting precedent; it could be argued 
both to be “non-discriminatory” as this restricted access equally concerns all entities in-
terested in these data, and to constitute “discrimination” since, for example, other sensed 
states might be interested in a similar kind of “protection” of their privacy and national 
interests as Israel. 
6 Radarsat 1 Data Use and Access 
The Canadian Space Agency (CSA), as owner of the intellectual property rights to the 
data generated by the Radarsat 1 satellite, released a policy document on access to and 
use of Radarsat 1 data on 19 July 1996. The document is expressly disclaiming “any legal 
value” as well as being a comprehensive “interpretation of Radarsat 1 data policies”; it 
purports merely “to facilitate the understanding of the Radarsat 1 system and its data use 
and access.” 
Radarsat 1 is the result of an international partnership involving Canadian and United 
States governments and various Canadian provincial governments. These partners are en-
titled to predetermined data allocations pursuant to relevant agreements concluded with 
the CSA, “at the cost of processing and distribution.” This definition seems to closely re-
semble the price “at or near the cost of reproduction of the data” for category 1 use Env-
isat data, and the “cost of fulfilling user requests” for unenhanced Landsat 7 data — but 
applies to certain allocated and agreed quota only. 
Central to the system of Radarsat 1 data distribution outside the scope of the partner-
ship proper is the Master License Agreement, by means of which the private company 
Radarsat International (RSI) is given the exclusive right of worldwide marketing and dis-
tribution as regards commercial data. RSI in addition is given the discretion to set the 
prices of data and data products. RSI is also allowed to license local distributors on an ex-
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clusive basis, that is exclusive both with respect to their “areas of prime responsibility,” 
and with respect to RSI as sole entity delivering data to these distributors. Thus, the pol-
icy followed by CSA in this respect is quite contrary to the “non-exclusivity” which fig-
ures so prominently in both ESA’s and the Landsat 7 data policies. 
The Radarsat document does mention UN Resolution 41/65 as well as the “open non-
discriminatory basis” required by it for access to its data; apparently the principle (with 
the addition of the word “open”) is not seen as leading to any conflict with the exclusivity 
of distribution handed to RSI or with the discretion of RSI to determine the prices for data 
products as long as no price differentiation results on the basis of the type and status of 
the requester, as opposed to the type of data, data product or service requested. 
It should be noted finally that the whole “structure” of CSA’s Earth observation activ-
ities and the role of RSI in this regard as sketched above have been shifting recently, as a 
consequence of fundamental changes in ownership and operational responsibilities of the 
various players concerned. 
7 CEOS Satellite Data Exchange Principles 
The Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS) drafted its own Satellite Data Ex-
change Principles in Support of Global Change Research in 1991 (see Appendix D). CEOS 
holds an interesting position in the field in that it brings together the primarily govern-
ment “primary distributors”: distributors of satellite data who run their own remote sens-
ing satellite systems or participate in the running of satellite systems. This position is re-
flected in the CEOS principles in focusing on the exchange between fundamentally equal 
entities — “haves” in terms of remote sensing satellites. 
The general dichotomy between scientific use and liberal data distribution policies is the 
main theme of this particular document. Thus, the investments made by governments and 
other public bodies in the sector are seen as deserving protection — obviously by means of 
a not-too-liberal distribution mechanism. From this perspective, the document is primar-
ily targeted at establishing a sort of level playing field, preventing more liberal-minded pri-
mary distributors from undercutting such general protection efforts. At the same time prin-
ciples for data exchange beyond these scientific uses were still to be developed. 
The general principle of “non-discriminatory access to data” is reaffirmed, albeit with-
out explicit reference to Resolution 41/65; little is provided by way of further explana-
tion. The goal of providing global change research entities with data at a price “reflecting 
primarily the cost of fulfilling the user request” is a common denominator of individual 
policies of the parties involved. “Non-discriminatory” access to data is to be applied to 
“all users for global change/climate and environmental research and monitoring” under 
Principle 5 of the CEOS data policy, whereas Principle 6 adds that preferably particular 
programs should not be given exclusive periods to use the data. 
8 Taking Stock: “Non-Discrimination” in Data Policy Documents 
The analysis above of interpretation and implementation of the “non-discrimination” prin-
ciple as it is provided for by Principle XII of Resolution 41/65 of course is far from exhaus-
tive. Nevertheless, the documents dealt with here may represent an interesting cross sec-
tion when it comes to the general aspects of interpretation and implementation since they 
are quite varying in character and origin. ESA and EUMETSAT are two European organiza-
tions in different ways actively involved in satellite remote sensing. Landsat 7 and Radarsat 
1 are remote sensing satellites run by national operators. CEOS is in juridical terms a rather 
low-key international cooperation forum for remote sensing satellite operators. 
Some of the documents dealt with make explicit reference to Resolution 41/65 and/or 
the principle of “non-discriminatory” access; others do not even make such reference im-
plicitly. This should not be interpreted as comprehensive disregard, neglect, or denial, for 
example in view of some aspects of “non-discrimination” having the status of a general 
principle of international law not specifically depending upon Resolution 41/65. Rather, 
the conclusion should be that Principle XII of Resolution 41/65 not being legally bind-
ing to begin with is of such a general character that perhaps the only type of discrimina-
tion which would clearly violate this Principle would be the discrimination as between 
“sensed state(s)” and other third states interested in a particular set of data, such discrim-
ination being to the detriment of the “sensed state(s).” 
This leads to the next question: how is the Principle, explicitly or de facto, interpreted 
and/or implemented? In the documents dealt with, very little is provided in any direct 
way. Not a single reference to the notion of a “sensed state” can be found. The principled dis-
cussion at the inter-state level between proponents and opponents of freedom of satellite 
remote sensing and data dissemination as underlying Principle XII of Resolution 41/65 
was not touched upon. Wherever the notion of “non-discriminatory” access is coined, it 
is either not dealt with in any further detail or elaborated in different directions — ap-
parently meaning that the relevant policy makers considered “non-discrimination” of the 
“sensed state” to be respected without requiring further guarantees or provisions. 
The policy of “non-exclusivity,” which is particularly prominent in a number of docu-
ments dealing with the interests of the scientific community in liberal data dissemination 
is immediately apparent. Radarsat 1, involving in a fundamental sense a private company 
in the distribution mechanism was the exception to the rule. This policy of “non-exclu-
sivity” can be argued to be in line at least with the basic underlying idea of the “non-dis-
crimination” principle: that no one should find himself totally unable to obtain certain 
sets of data available to others. 
“Non-discrimination” obviously has other aspects. Here it becomes clear that distin-
guishing between various categories as such is not generally considered as being in vio-
lation of this principle since it appears frequently and in many forms. To begin with, it is 
quite logical that the fundamental distinction in terms of access and/or pricing between 
the (usually public) organizations paying for certain satellite operations and “their” enti-
ties, and “outsiders” not participating as such in the satellite remote sensing operations, 
does not constitute “discrimination” in the proper sense of the word. 
However, the allowable distinctions go beyond advantages for the participants in the 
program generating the data at issue. Two methods of distinction are generally followed 
here: distinguishing by use (usually non-commercial versus commercial) and distinguish-
ing by user (usually scientific/public versus commercial/private). Generally speaking, 
the first might be more faithful to any “non-discrimination” principle in theory but more 
difficult to apply in practice. The effects of such distinction are found in various areas: re-
garding the sets of data to which access is provided, the conditions under which it is pro-
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vided, and the price to be paid for such data. Other than such general aspects, little uni-
formity can be detected amongst the various policy documents analyzed . 
Finally, with a view to the general background of the “non-discrimination” principle 
as pronounced by Principle XII of UN Resolution 41/65, it is noteworthy that with the in-
teresting exception of EUMETSAT’s 1998 Data Policy, no evidence has been found during 
the present research for implementation of any measure of “positive discrimination” of 
the developing nations. 
9 Conclusions 
The “non-discrimination” principle of Resolution 41/65 generally referred to by the var-
ious documents which were evaluated and thus (even if often only de facto) interpreted 
and implemented by the relevant bodies is of a fairly limited nature. The additional pro-
viso on “reasonable cost terms” opens the door to a number of important distinctions. 
“Equal” cases not to be discriminated between under Principle XII thus essentially con-
cern the cases where one state (or its entities) seeking access to certain data is the “sensed 
state” and another state (or its entities) seeking access to the same data is not the object of 
those data. 
Participants to a particular satellite remote sensing project and non-participants are 
definitely not to be considered “equal” cases even if this appreciation — logically and po-
litically obvious as it may be — leads to a de facto “discrimination” of developing states 
generally. Developing states have almost by definition less opportunity, financially and 
otherwise, to become participants in satellite remote sensing. Exceptions such as the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, India, Indonesia and Brazil are still just that. 
Furthermore, scientific or other clear public usage versus commercial usage and us-
ers are not considered “equal” cases either. In whatever way the distinctions are usually 
made they all involve the pricing instrument, thus implementing the “reasonableness” 
of “cost terms” in a particular sense. Scientific and public usage and users are presented 
with fees at cost level (with only minor deviations as to the exact definition of “cost level”) 
or even a waiver of fees, whilst commercial usage or users will lead to higher prices and, 
in addition more discretion of the actual data distributor in determining the exact prices. 
Finally, these general threads are more or less the maximum extent to which any uni-
formity can be discerned at all amongst the policies concerned. They reflect more of a 
general international legal principle of “non-discrimination” than the particular version 
of Resolution 41/65, unless one chooses to focus on the “reasonable cost terms” proviso. 
Consequently, from the perspective of satellite remote sensing data policy, the “non-dis-
crimination” principle of Resolution 41/65 provides only marginal guidance and even 
less obstacles or legal parameters. If a global — or even Europe-wide — level playing 
field in terms of data availability, balancing in a uniform way the interests of science and 
the public at large with the interests in protecting investments in satellite remote sens-
ing systems and operations, is to be the final aim, a lot of legislative and quasi-legislative 
work remains to be done. 
